In counterfactual QKD information is transfered, in a secure way, between Alice and Bob even when no particle carrying the information is in fact transmitted between them. In this letter we fully implement the scheme for counterfactual QKD proposed in [T. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)], demonstrating for the first time that information can be transmitted between two parties without the transmission of a carrier.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for transmitting a secret key between two partners (usually named Alice and Bob) by exploiting quantum properties of light. The most important characteristic of this idea is that the secrecy of the generated key is guaranteed by the very laws of nature, i.e. by the properties of quantum states [1, 2] . In the last decade QKD is moving from laboratories to become a mature technology for commercialization [3] ; communications over more than 100 km having been achieved both in fiber [4] and open air [5] .
However, beyond its commercial interest QKD represents also a fruitful test bed of concepts and ideas blossoming from quantum information theory and studies on foundations of quantum mechanics [1, 2, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
In this sense a very interesting scheme was recently presented on this journal by Noh [11] , who suggested a QKD protocol (usually called N09) where the information is transmitted, in a secure way, between Alice and Bob even when no particle carrying the information is in fact transmitted between them. In essence the scheme exploits a counterfactual measurement, for this reason it is also known as Counterfactual QKD (CQKD).
The counterfactual measurement, which relies on fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, is a typical example of interaction-free measurement that detects the state of an object without an interaction occurring between it and the measuring device. One of the most widely known application of counterfactual measurement can be found in the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb-testing problem [12] , a well known thought experiment successfully experimentally implemented in the nineties [13] .
CQKD [11] challenges the usual paradigma requiring an effective transmission of a signal carrier (usually a photon) between the two parties exchanging information and therefore represents a very important conceptual development paving the way to further studies.
In Ref. [14] a more efficient and complicated CQKD was proposed, whereas security issues of the N09 protocol were considered in Ref. [15] , where it was proved its unconditional security by considering its equivalence to an entanglement distillation protocol. Finally, very recently, a security proof for intercept-resend attacks in realistic situation (non unit detector efficiency and presence of dark counts) was provided [16] .
A first attempt to realize experimentally Noh's scheme is reported in Ref. [17] . However, this set up missed the key element of CQKD, since the photon was indeed transmitted between Alice and Bob.
In this letter we fully implement the N09 CQKD scheme, demonstrating for the first time that information can be transmitted between two parties without the transmission of an information carrier.
To explain the principle of the proposed protocol, we describe an alternative version, absolutely equivalent to the original one [11] , which is shown in Fig.1 (a) .
Alice randomly rotates the single photon polarization (which originally is to be assumed horizontal) by means of a half wave plate (HWPA), either by 0 (bit value "0") or by π/2 (bit value "1"). Then, the photon enters one port of a 50 : 50 beam splitter (BS), which is the first element of a Michelson interferometer. After BS, according to the polarization, the photon is in one of the two orthogonal states:
The path A of the interferometer (containing an optical delay OD and a mirror) is inside Alice's sector, while path B reaches Bob's one. Bob randomly selects one of the two polarisations and detects the photon in this polarisation allowing the photon in the complementary polarisation to fly back to Alice's site. This is achieved exploiting the HWPB and the Polarizing beam splitter (PBS). In particular, as the PBS addresses the |V photon towards D2, while |H photon is sent towards the mirror (M), rotations of the polarization of 0 and π/2 induced by the HWPB correspond to the detection of |V and |H photon state by D2. If the photon is not detected by D2 but reflected back by M it passes through the HWPB in the selected position, thus the photon gains back its original polarization state interfering with itself at BS at Alice's site and, for a proper tuning of the optical delay OD, it deterministically exits in D0.
When Alice and Bob select complementary polarization rotations, then either the photon is transmitted by BS and detected by Bob at D2 with 50% probability (since its polarization at PBS is vertical), or it is reflected in path A and consequently detected by D0 or D1 with equal probability (25%). After the detection is completed Alice and Bob can communicate each other whether or not each of the detectors clicked. If clicked either D0 or D2, with the purpose of detecting the intervention of an eventual eavesdropper, they announce both the detected and the initial polarization state. If D1 clicks Alice compares the initial and final polarization states: if they are consistent she does not reveal any information, otherwise she announces her result. Alice and Bob can then establish a common key by using only the events when the photon was detected at D1 with the correct polarization.
The only apparent difference between the scheme discussed here and the original proposal in Ref [11] is in the apparatus used by Bob to detect the photon at D2. Nonetheless the one shown accomplishes exactly the same task, thus the two schemes should be considered absolutely equivalent.
The very interesting point of this scheme is that the selection of events only at detector D1 correspond to photons that have traveled path A, i.e. never exited Alice's sector. Therefore, the task of creating a secret key has been accomplished without any photon carrying the information having been outside Alice's laboratory.
In the following we present the results of our equivalent implementation of the protocol which is completely analogous to the one of Fig. 1(a) , but it is based on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer instead of a Michelson interferometer.
In our experimental set up, as shown in Fig. 1(b) , a heralded single photon source exploiting parametric down-conversion (PDC) is used : a 100 mW laser emitting at 406 nm in continuous-wave regime pumps a type-I BBO crystal producing degenerate PDC at 812 nm. The emission of the PDC photons is slightly non-collinear corresponding to an emission angle of approximately 3
• with respect to the pump direction. The heralding photon after passing through a 10 nm bandwidth interferential filter and a 4 mm wide pinhole is coupled to a multi-mode fiber and addressed to the trigger detector. The heralded photon, to be used as our true single photon state, is selected by an interferential filter (1 nm FWHM) and coupled to a single mode fiber leading to the input of the interferometer.
The latter is a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) in which each arm has an adjustable trombone prism. One of the two arms is entirely included in Alice's site, while the other contains both the quantum channel and Bob's site, the latter being composed by a PBS between two half-wave plates (HWPB1, HWPB2) and D2 detector.
The balance of the interferometer is guaranteed by a closed-loop piezo-electric movement system, which stabilizes the position of one of the trombones regulating the length difference between the two optical paths inside the MZI with nanometric resolution.
The outputs of the interferometer, after spatial selection via 1 mm diameter-wide irises, are then coupled in multi-mode fiber with no further spectral selection and all the signals (including the heralding photons and D2 clicks) are revealed by Single Photon Avalanche Detectors (SPADs) with a ≈ 60% detection efficiency at 812 nm.
Coincidence and time-tag analysis of the incoming signals are performed by means of PicoQuant HydraHarp 400 multichannel picosecond event timer. All the reported data were acquired in measurements of 20 seconds. Our results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions and represent a proof of principle of the experimental feasibility of CQKD.
In Fig. 2 interference fringes with high visibility can be observed in the coincidence counts between the heralding channel and each of the MZI output detectors D0 and D1 as a function of the displacement of the prism balancing the interferometer (within the coherence length of the signal, which, according to the filters used, is of the order of hundreds of µm) when Alice and Bob use compatible sets of polarization rotation angles ({θ A , θ B } = {0, 0} or {θ A , θ B } = {π/2, π/2}). It can also be noticed that for this choice of angles the D2 counts are consistent with zero as expected. In particular, when no rotation at all is performed ({0, 0}), the maximum visibilities are (92 ± 4)% for D0 and (96 ± 4)% for D1, while interference gets slightly spoiled for {π/2, π/2} where the visibilities for D0 and D1 are respectively (87 ± 4)% and (91 ± 4)%, values which, nonetheless, are sufficient for the proof of the protocol. The uncertainty on the visibilities is obtained assuming a Poissonian distribution for the coincidence counts. Fig. 3 shows the stability of the interferometer in a half-an-hour long measurement when the balance of the two optical paths is fixed.
The performances of our key distribution process are summarized in Table I . Corresponding to the angles {0, π/2} and {π/2, 0}, D1 and D0 counts are approximately equal, as in this condition no interference should be present. These are the events relative to the actual transmission of information. In fact, the clicking of D1 delivers a bit of the secret key between the users even if no real photon travels in the quantum channel.
In order to characterize the communication it is necessary to estimate the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) defined as the ratio between the probability for Bob to register an incorrect bit and the sum of the probabilities of getting either a correct or an incorrect bit. In our case Bob gets an incorrect bit when D1 clicks even if Alice and Bob use the same angle of polarization rotations and the events related to the correct transmission are those in which D1 clicks when interference is destroyed. Furthermore, we notice that when Alice and Bob use complementary polarizations the amount of photons with the wrong polarization detected by D1 is effectively null when dark counts are subtracted. We can thus define QBER as
where P D1,int is the probability for D1 to register a photon when Alice's and Bob's polarization rotations are equal, such that there is (destructive) interference, and P D1,nint is the analogous probability in the case in which Alice and Bob choose different angles. For our measurements the mean QBER is QBER = (12 ± 1)%. We underline that all the reported measurements are obtained without subtraction of background and accidental counts. If we account for these contributions, the corrected QBER value decreases noticeably to QBER ′ = (7 ± 1)%, as would be the case if more reliable detectors were used, such as detectors affected by a lower dark count rate. As already mentioned, the protocol has been demonstrated absolutely secure when ideal single photon sources are employed. To address the security problems eventually raised by the practical implementation of the protocol, firstly we tested it against possible photon-number-splitting attacks, i. e. we investigated the quality of of our heralded single photon source. From the measured count rates we obtained a value of g 2 (0) = (7 ± 5) * 10 −9 , which clearly shows negligible presence of multi-photon components. The rea-son for such a small value is related to the very low level of count rates (180 maximum in 20 seconds acquisitions) at the detectors. This is basically due to the poor coupling efficiency of the heralded source (approximately 5%), the strict spectral selection on the heralding photons (1 nm FWHM filtering with 26% transmittance), and also because of the spatial selection at the interferometers output (we used irises as narrow as 1mm in diameter to optimize the visibility of the interference fringes). Furthermore, a small temporal detection window (1 ns) was selected in correspondence of the arrival of the heralding photon. Because of this temporal postselection we mention that unheralded photons may travel inside the channel and Eve may exploit that to get significant information by intercepting them. In order to overcome this security issue, shuttered heralded singlephoton sources [20] should be considered a valuable solution, as they present comparable performances with respect to the non-shuttered ones. Future developments of the scheme will include shuttered sources together with stabilized fiber interferometers for wider distance.
We also address the issue of robustness of the protocol against more general attacks by computing the difference m = I AB − I AE , where I AB (I AE ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob (Alice and Eve), in the cases of general Intercept-Resend attacks and "Time-Shift" attacks. Following the models suggested in Ref. [16] , one can express m for the intercept-resend attack as
where P D1 , P e1 are respectively the click probability and the error probability at D1 and h(x) is the binary Shannon Entropy. Regarding the time-shift attack, where Eve exploits the non-ideality of the detectors, one must subtract from the previous value two contributions, obtaining:
where γ accounts for the maximum corrupted bit rate due to dark counts and ∆I AE (η) = 1−η 2η (P D2 − P e2 ) is the increment of the mutual information between A and E due to non-unit efficiency of the detectors.
Both values calculated from the collected data are positive (m IR = 0.23 ± 0.04, m T S = 0.15 ± 0.06), ensuring the possibility of distributing a secret key [1, 2] Altogether our results provide a satisfying proof-ofprinciple of the QKD scheme realized in free-space. Nonetheless, recent results on the implementation of high stability fiber based Mach-Zehnder interferometers (over distances of the order of some km) [18, 19] certify the possibility of exploiting this protocol in "real-life" (as well as commercial) applications.
In conclusion in this paper we have presented the first experimental demonstration of counterfactual QKD.
{0, 0}
{0, π/2} {π/2, π/2} {π/2, 0} CD0 180 ± 4 59 ± 2 159 ± 4 59 ± 2 CD1 7.9 ± 0.9 53 ± 2 7.2 ± 0.9 59 ± 2 CD2 6.6 ± 0.8 85 ± 3 5.4 ± 0.7 86 ± 3 VD0 (92 ± 4)% (0 ± 4)% (0 ± 4)% (87 ± 4)% VD1 (96 ± 4)% (0 ± 4)% (0 ± 4)% (91 ± 4)% QBER (12 ± 1)% TABLE I: Resume of the main results in the implementation of the CQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [11] . Each column refers to a set {θA, θB} of polarization rotation performed by the users and CDi labels the mean coincidence counts at the i-th detector in acquisition of 20 seconds. VD0, VD1 are the visibilities of the interference fringes observed at the two outputs of the interferometer by scanning the path length difference between the two arms of the MZI. QBER is the estimated quantum bit error rate for the transmission .
This result, beyond its eventual practical interest, has a huge conceptual significance since it demonstrates for the first time as information can be transmitted between two partners, thanks to quantum systems peculiar properties, in a situation where no carrier has been actually transmitted between them. We acknowledge the support of MIQC EU project.
